The Mu’tazila

The Mu’tazila are considered the leaders of rational thought in Islamic history. Throughout their intellectual history, they struggled for a long time to establish the rational school of thought that goes beyond the apparent meaning of the Qur’an and Sunnah toward their higher objectives, without stopping at literal interpretation.

It is necessary at the beginning to point out with sadness the involvement of the Mu’tazila in the ordeal of the createdness of the Qur’an, which was a result of the strict orientations of the enlightened Caliph al-Ma’mun, and after him of course al-Mu‘tasim and al-Wathiq. Despite the noble aims intended by al-Ma’mun’s scientific, cultural, and intellectual renaissance, its involvement in the use of politics and the agreement of a number of Mu’tazilite imams to play this disgraceful role—most notably Ahmad ibn Abi Du’ad, Bishr al-Marisi, and Thumama ibn Ashras—is something that cannot be justified. It harmed twice: first, the Sunni jurists who were subjected to persecution because of their opinions, and second, the great harm to the Mu’tazilite heritage itself, which became a condemned heritage after the political reversal carried out by al-Mutawakkil after he assumed the caliphate.

This introduction is necessary so that we can precisely indicate the intended meaning of Mu’tazilite positions away from the harsh political and partisan context, which whenever it enters thought, corrupts it.

So can I then write independently from the painful period of Mu’tazilite involvement in politics?

The Mu’tazila, since their emergence, suffered persecution, and this suffering was one of the clearest proofs of their revolutionary project in dominant Islamic thought, and their continuous attempt to present a rational interpretation of Islam, in matters of the unseen and of the witnessed alike, and to affirm that the Qur’an is created, and that it is not prepared for every time and place, and that it is possible to deal with it as a historical text, in which consideration is given to the specificity of the cause and not the generality of the wording, and that the reasons for its revelation govern the horizon of its meanings.

And that the mixing of the Qur’an with God, and considering the Qur’an to be God Himself, or an attribute existing in Him, is extremism in religion, and that many jurists fell into extremism regarding the Qur’an and mixed it with God, as the Christians fell into extremism regarding Jesus Christ.

The Qur’an is the speech of God, and not God Himself, and it is revelation from God and not God Himself, and it was revealed in harmony with events, and there is no logical reason to assume the eternity of a text such as “Perish the hands of Abu Lahab” or the text “When Zayd had fulfilled his desire from her, We married her to you.” These are all situational texts in which the Qur’an informs after the occurrence of events, and this is something that does not require any assumption of the unseen, but is closely connected to the world of observation.

And it must be said that the name Mu’tazila cannot be justified by the claim that Wasil ibn ‘Ata’ withdrew from the circle of al-Hasan al-Basri in the mosque of Basra, when he disagreed with him on the issue of the “intermediate position between two positions,” and in which al-Hasan al-Basri said: Wasil has withdrawn from us, so the name became dominant over the group. And this story—even assuming its authenticity—does not carry a sufficient reason for the Mu’tazila to adhere to this name, since they preserved in their writings and studies this designation continuously.

And my conviction is that the Mu’tazila were named in this way in the context of the fourfold reality that the Islamic world was living at that time, where you cannot understand any social or religious activity except within the framework of the prevailing fourfold division: Sunnah, Shi‘a, Khawarij, and Mu’tazila.

So the Sunnah are those who aligned with the side of the two caliphs and those after them, and the Shi‘a are those who rejected the two caliphs and those after them except Ali, and the Khawarij are those who rejected everyone and fought them, while the Mu’tazilite position is clear, which is the withdrawal from all the fitna, and the withdrawal from the entire conflict, on the basis that it is a political conflict based on ambitions, and there is no religious reason that drives you to fight in any of the conflicting parties, and that what is required is the withdrawal from all fitnas. And indeed, you do not find a Mu’tazilite except that he withdrew from all fitnas and was not a party in them.

And thus their naming becomes consistent as their conditions and behavior indicate, and there is nothing in their life that is blameworthy except their involvement in al-Ma’mun’s inclination in the ordeal of the created Qur’an.

And this is what the most important Mu’tazilite philosopher, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar al-Hamadhani, chose when he said: that Mu’tazilism is not a new doctrine, nor a passing sect, nor an innovation, but rather a continuation of what the Messenger of God ﷺ and his companions were upon, and that this name came to them because of their withdrawal from evil, according to the saying of God: “And I withdraw from you and what you invoke besides God,” and the saying of the Prophet ﷺ: “Whoever withdraws from evil falls into good.”

And among the most important Mu’tazilite imams are Wasil ibn ‘Ata’ who is associated with the emergence of Mu’tazilism and died in 131 AH, Ibrahim ibn Sayyar al-Nazzam, Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf, Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir, Ma‘mar ibn ‘Abbad, and the most famous of them Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, judge of Rayy, as well as al-Jahiz and his most important book al-Bayan wa al-Tabyin.

It is also possible to consider a number of rebels against the Umayyads such as Aban ibn Sima‘an, al-Ja‘d ibn Dirham, Jahm ibn Safwan, and Ghilan al-Dimashqi as holders of Mu’tazilite views even if they preceded Wasil ibn ‘Ata’.

And so as not to go far in speaking about the Mu’tazila, we will limit ourselves to their position on the brotherhood of religions, which is the essence of this book.

It can be said that the Mu’tazila in Islam are the founders of theodicy in Islam, which was later explained by the German philosopher Leibniz and after him Immanuel Kant, as we will explain later. Theodicy is the justification of the acts of God and their interpretation in a way based on justice, away from the literal meanings of texts, which can be found clearly in every Mu’tazilite position in theological matters.

The Mu’tazila did not hesitate to affirm that the justice of God is a principle of religion, and all those who spoke about their principles began with the principle of unity and justice, and the two words are inseparable. Unity means refraining from attributing any created being to the Creator, and they went to the extent of denying the eternity of all attributes except existence, all of that for the transcendence of God.

And justice is the central attribute of God, and no legal obligation can be understood unless the justice of God is realized in it, and in this context they denied predestination because it contradicts divine justice.

In this context, the Mu’tazila achieved advanced positions in the brotherhood of religions and called for excusing creation in their differences based on the justice of God, and they openly rejected what common people say regarding God’s choosing of a nation over nations, or a time over times, or a person over persons to be the object of His mercy, and that the Messenger intercedes for his nation without others, and from that is the belief that Islam abrogates all previous laws, without establishing proof upon people.

For it is not just nor rational to equate those who witnessed the prophethood and mission in Mecca or Medina with those who witnessed it in the jungles of India or the unknown regions of China, or those who came after them, even if they heard that a prophet had appeared in the Hijaz and said he was inspired, and those around him believed him, but they did not witness what the companions witnessed, nor did they engage in their dialogue, nor did they hear the Book recited to them, and so it is neither just nor rational that they be judged the same judgment.

And the Mu’tazila wrote extensively about rational good and evil, and they saw that reason is capable of independently knowing good and evil, and that revelation is a light that guides and not a constraint that binds, and that nations are capable through pure reasoning of reaching knowledge of good and evil, and that prophecy is necessary to guide the common people, but the people of reasoning and wisdom are guided by prophecy but reach its aims through reasoning.

And although the principles of the Mu’tazila are sufficient to establish a clear understanding of the brotherhood of religions and excusing those who were not given the proof of God as it was given to the Arabs through the Messenger and the companions and the Islamic state, very little has been transmitted from their writings on this matter, because most of what was transmitted about them in this field came from their opponents.

And among that is what al-Ghazali transmitted from al-Jahiz when he said:

“Al-Jahiz held that whoever opposes the religion of Islam among Jews and Christians and atheists—if he is obstinate while believing otherwise, then he is sinful; and if he investigates and is unable to reach the truth, then he is excused and not sinful; and if he does not investigate because he does not know that investigation is obligatory, then he is also excused; and only the obstinate is punished, because God does not burden a soul beyond its capacity.”

And al-Kufi reported from al-Jahiz and al-‘Anbari: there is no sin upon one who errs in sincere pursuit of truth absolutely, even if he is from another religion.

And al-Ghazali responded to al-Jahiz and considered his view weak, and it is astonishing that he used as evidence for its invalidity that the Messenger used to kill non-Muslims when they reached maturity!! while he is certain that they were imitators upon whom no proof had been established!!!

And I can only strongly object to what al-Ghazali said in describing the noble Prophet as killing people when they reached maturity, and that they were not obstinate and that no proof had been established against them!! Glory be to God, how does outward formalism lead its people to accuse noble prophets of what only arrogant, oppressive, corrupt people on earth would do.

And in general, I refer to the Mu’tazila here because their framework of justice obliges them to the position of excusing people of other religions, but I admit that I have not found sufficient explicit texts from them in this matter to establish it clearly in the branches, although it is indicated by their principlTop of FormBottom of Form